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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
We show that short and long nominal interest rates are independent monetary policy instruments. The 
pegging of both helps solving the problem of multiplicity that arises when only short rates are used as the 
instrument of policy. A peg of the nominal returns on assets of different maturities is equivalent to a peg 
of state-contingent interest rates. These are the rates that should be targeted in order to implement unique 
equilibria. At the zero bound, while it is still possible to target state-contingent interest rates, that is no 
longer equivalent to the target of the term structure. 
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At the zero bound for the short term nominal interest rate, are there additional
monetary policy instruments? If the short rates today are zero, but the long rates
are not, can these be lowered? Can monetary policy be conducted with both short
and long interest rates? Can the whole term structure of nominal interest rates
be targeted? Should the whole term structure be targeted?
These are old questions of recent renewed interest. There is historical evidence
that "...a su¢ ciently determined Fed can peg or cap Treasury bond prices and
yields at other than the shortest maturities."1 Indeed in the 40￿ s and 50￿ s, before
the Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord of 1951, the Fed managed to establish both
the rate on the 90-day Treasury bill and a ceiling on the 12-month Treasury
certi￿cate. This was achieved without the need to hold a signi￿cant share of long
maturity bonds. Operation Twist, in the 1960￿ s, was an attempt by the Fed to
raise short rates and lower long rates.2 More recently, in 2009, the ECB conducted
one week, three and six months, and one year, liquidity providing operations at
￿xed rates. The recent episodes of very low targets for short term rates, in Japan
in the last 15 years, in the US in 2003 and 2004,3 and during the recent ￿nancial
crisis,4 prompted again the policy question of whether a central bank can target
both short and long rates, with the hope of lowering the latter, given that the
former cannot be lowered.
There is not much literature on this issue. McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams
(2005) discuss the possibility of following a Taylor type rule on a long rate, rather
than the short rate. Woodford (2005) commenting on McGough et al. argues
that there is nothing policy on the long rates can do, that cannot be done with
policy on the short rate. Instead, we show that targeting both short and long
rates helps implement a unique equilibrium in the large set of competitive equilib-
ria. Short and long term nominal interest rates are independent monetary policy
instruments, and they can, and should, both be used as instruments of policy.
Interestingly, the zero bound is an exception to the general result. Precisely at
the zero bound, when the economy stays there, no matter what, short and long
rates are no longer independent instruments, and targeting both does not solve
1Ben Bernanke in a speech to the National Economists Club in 2002.
2See Bernanke (2002).
3In June, 2003, the Fed funds rate fell down to the, by then, historical low level of 1%, and
remained there for one year.
4At the end of 2008, the target for the Fed funds rate reached zero and remained there.
2the multiplicity problem. A small deviation from the zero bound, however, allows
to recover the results. It is in this sense that the results are general.
The problem of multiplicity of equilibria when the monetary policy instrument
is the short term interest rate was ￿rst formally addressed by Sargent and Wal-
lace (1975). In an attempt to side step the multiplicity problem, McCallum (1981)
proposes an interest rate feedback such that there is a locally determinate equi-
libria at the expense of multiple explosive solutions. A large literature on local
determinacy followed (see Woodford, 2003 among many others5). Attention was
focused on the local determinate equilibrium, and other solutions were ignored on
the basis of arbitrary technical restrictions.
There have been various attempts at solving the problem of multiplicity of
equilibria under interest rate policy. The ￿scal theory of the price level (see
Cochrane (2007) for a critical discussion) assumes that tax rates are also exoge-
nous, so that there are additional equilibrium restrictions that can be used to pin
down equilibria . In contrast with this literature, we assume throughout the paper
that ￿scal policy is determined endogenously, in line with the extensive literature
on local and global determinacy.
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (2009) consider out of equilibrium escape clauses
in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1983) and Nicolini (1996), and Christiano
and Rostagno (2002). The point of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ and Nicolini was that
if some form of convertibility was to be introduced in case prices deviated from
some equilibrium, then there would be a unique equilibrium where convertibility
would not be used.
While, in general, interest rate feedback rules give rise to multiplicity there are
cases of rules that deliver global uniqueness. This has been shown by Loisel (2008)
in a linear model and by Adªo, Correia and Teles (2009) in standard monetary
models.
In this paper, we start by illustrating, using a simple ￿ exible price monetary
model, that targeting the return on noncontingent short term bonds can pin down
the conditional expectation of in￿ ation but not the distribution of realized in￿ ation
across states. If the model was deterministic, given an initial price level, the target
for the short term nominal interest rate, would be able to determine the whole
path of price levels. Not so, under uncertainty. Even if the classical problem
of multiplicity of the initial price level is solved, there is still multiplicity of the
distribution of prices across states. The nominal interest rate is a noncontingent
5Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, 2002), Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a), among many others.
3return and therefore can only be used to determine expectations of in￿ ation, and
not realized in￿ ation. This multiplicity of equilibria is still present if the policy
rule is a feedback rule for the short term nominal rate, and it is also present under
a money supply rule.
We show that targeting the returns on nominal assets of di⁄erent maturities
can solve the multiplicity of equilibria associated with uncertainty. The intuition
is very simple. If monetary policy were to target the returns on state-contingent
nominal assets, then given an initial price level, it would be able to pin down
the price level in every date and state. Targeting the returns on state-contingent
nominal assets is, under certain conditions, equivalent to targeting the returns
on assets of di⁄erent maturities. A necessary condition is that the number of
maturities equals the number of possible contingencies. But this is not su¢ cient.
There has to be variability in the noncontingent returns. For this reason, exactly at
the zero bound, if the economy was to stay there for any possible contingency, then
the equivalence result would not go through. In this case of, mostly theoretical
interest, it would be necessary to target the state contingent returns in order to
pin down realized in￿ ation rates.
In a ￿ exible price economy, when policy is conducted with interest rate targets,
prices are not pinned down but allocations are. Instead, under sticky prices,
setting the path for the nominal interest rates not only does not pin down prices,
it also generates multiple equilibria in the allocations. We extend the results to a
simple sticky price environment.
Our results are related to the results in Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2003),
Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2004). These papers analyze the degrees of
multiplicity of equilibria when policy is conducted with a target for the nominal
interest rate. In order to be able to count, they consider a ￿nite horizon monetary
economy and show that when policy is conducted with a target for the nominal
interest rate, the degree of multiplicity is the number of terminal nodes of the event
tree. Adªo, Correia and Teles (2009) show that the economy with an in￿nite
horizon is not the limit of the ￿nite horizon economy. In particular there are
interest rate rules that achieve uniqueness in the in￿nite horizon economy, that
would still lead to multiplicity in the ￿nite horizon economy.
The results are also related to the ones in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and
Nicolini (2004) that have shown that state-contingent debt may be replicated by
debt of multiple maturities. Their proof is for quantities, ours for prices, but the
mechanisms are similar. They also need as many maturities as the number of
contingencies.
41.1. A preview
Arbitrage between holding a two period bond to maturity and rolling over one





















t is the period t gross compound return on a two-period bond, and R1
t
and R1
t+1 are the gross returns on the one-period bond in periods t and t + 1,
respectively.
uC(t+2)
Pt+2 is the marginal utility of one unit of money in period t + 2.


















which is the pure expectations hypothesis of the term structure. The long rate
is given by the sequence of short rates. In this case obviously the short and long
rates are not independent instruments. Targeting the short rates pins down the
long rates.
If the short rate in period t + 1 is R1
t+1 = 1, in every state, corresponding to
the zero bound, then the covariance is zero, and setting the short rates at the
zero bound, also sets the long rates, at the zero bound. Note that this is not the
interesting policy case, where short rates are zero, but long rates are not.






is not zero. And
it turns out that it is a function of the long rates. Targeting both short and
long rates, helps pinning down the covariance, allowing to implement uniquely a
desirable process for allocations and prices.
Our approach is very di⁄erent from the more common approach to implemen-
tation, based on local determinacy of equilibria, as in Woodford (2005). According
to this, if monetary policy is conducted using an interest rate feedback rule for the
short term interest rate, then, under certain conditions, there is a locally determi-
nate equilibrium, and a locally determinate term premium.6 At the determinate
solution, the long rates are obtained by arbitrage from the short rates. It would
not be possible to use both short and long rates if the locally determinate equi-
librium was indeed the single equilibrium. But it is not.7 The locally determinate
6This means that the linear system of equations that approximates the equilibrium conditions
in the neighborhood of a steady state, has a unique solution in that neighborhood and multiple
solutions outside that neighborhood.
7See Cochrane (2007) for a general discussion.
5equilibrium is only one of the possible equilibria.8
2. A model with ￿ exible prices
We ￿rst consider a simple cash in advance economy with ￿ exible prices. The
economy consists of a representative household, a representative ￿rm behaving
competitively, and a government. The uncertainty in period t ￿ 0 is described
by the random variable st 2 St, where St is the set of possible events at t, and
the history of its realizations up to period t (state or node at t), (s0;s1;:::;st), is
denoted by st 2 St. We assume that st has a discrete distribution. The number
of states in period t ￿ 0 is ￿t.
Production uses labor according to a linear technology. We impose a cash-
in-advance constraint on the households￿transactions with the timing structure
described in Lucas and Stokey (1983). That is, each period is divided into two
subperiods, with the assets market operational in the ￿rst subperiod and the goods
market in the second.
2.1. Competitive equilibria
Households The households have preferences over consumption C (st), and


















where ￿ is a discount factor. The households start period t, in state st, with nomi-
nal wealth W(st). They decide to hold money, M (st), and to buy Bj (st) nominal
bonds that pay Rj (st)Bj (st), j = 1;:::;n, periods later. R1 (st) is the gross short
term nominal interest rate. They also buy Z (st+1) units of state-contingent nom-
inal securities. Each security pays one unit of money at the beginning of period
t+1 in state st+1. Let Q(st+1=st) be the beginning of period t price of these secu-
rities normalized by the probability of the occurrence of the state. The households
spend EtQ(st+1=st)Z (st+1) in state-contingent nominal securities. Thus, in the
8See Benhabib, Schmitt￿ Grohe and Uribe (2001b), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2001b, 2002, 2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2009). They show that the conditions for
local determinacy may in fact be conditions for global indeterminacy.


























where the initial nominal wealth W(s0) is given.















At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income W (st)N (st);
where N (st) = 1 ￿ L(st) is labor and W (st) is the nominal wage rate and pay














































The households￿problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the
restrictions (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), together with a no-Ponzi games condition on the
holdings of assets.









































Condition (2.5) sets the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption equal to the real wage adjusted for the cost of using
7money, R1 (st). Condition (2.6) is an intertemporal marginal condition necessary
for the optimal choice of risk-free nominal bonds of di⁄erent maturities. Condition
(2.7) determines the price of one unit of money at time t + 1, for each state st+1,
normalized by the conditional probability of occurrence of state st+1, in units of
money at time t, in state st.
Firms The ￿rms are competitive and prices are ￿ exible. The production func-





















Government The policy variables are taxes T (st), nominal interest rates Rj (st),
state-contingent nominal prices Q(st+1=st), money supplies M (st), state-noncontingent
public debt Bj (st) and state-contingent debt Z (st+1). The government expendi-
tures, Gt, are exogenous.





















































, t ￿ 0
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. Let Q(st+1) ￿ Q(st+1=s0), with





































































We have already imposed market clearing in the money and asset markets.
Equilibria A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of policy variables, quan-
tities and prices such that the private agents solve their problems given the se-
quences of policy variables and prices, the budget constraint of the government is
satis￿ed, and markets clear.
The competitive equilibrium conditions for the variables fC (st);L(st)g, and

























that are obtained from the households intratemporal conditions (2.5) and the
￿rms optimal condition (2.9), as well as the cash in advance constraints (2.3), the
intertemporal conditions (2.6) and (2.7), the budget constraints (2.10).
The equations identi￿ed above determine a set of equilibrium allocations,
prices and policy variables. In order for a particular equilibrium in this set to
be implemented, it is necessary to determine exogenous policy rules for a subset
of the policy variables.
In the next section we will show that, if interest rates are set exogenously in
every date and state, there is multiplicity under uncertainty. The appropriate
policy instruments, that allow to implement a unique equilibrium, are the returns
on state-contingent nominal assets.
2.2. Multiplicity of equilibria with interest rate policy
We start by showing that if the policy instrument is the short term nominal
interest rate, given an initial price level, it is possible to implement a unique
9equilibrium in the deterministic economy, but not under uncertainty. From the
resource constraints, (2.11) and the intratemporal conditions (2.12), we can write
consumption and leisure as functions of the short term nominal rate, C(R1 (st))













, t ￿ 0
(2.13)
together with the cash in advance constraints, (2.3), and the budget constraints,
(2.10).
Suppose the short term nominal interest rate R1 (st) is set exogenously in
every date and state. The allocation is then pinned down uniquely. Given the
process for R1 (st), the allocation is obtained from the functions C(R1 (st)) and
L(R1 (st)). The issue is how can a unique sequence of prices levels be pinned
down. If there was no uncertainty, given an initial price level, the intertemporal
conditions (2.13) would determine the price level uniquely for every date t ￿ 1.
Instead, under uncertainty, even if the initial price level is given, there are still
multiple equilibria for the price level in each state.
To see this, notice that in any period t ￿ 1, given P (st￿1), there are ￿t￿1
equations to determine ￿t variables, P (st). More speci￿cally, for each state st￿1,
there is one equation to determine #St variables, where #St is the number of
possible events at t. Except for the deterministic case, there are multiple solutions
for the price level.
The indeterminacy of the initial price level in the deterministic economy is
replaced by the indeterminacy of one price level per history, under uncertainty.
As we will see below this explosion in degrees of multiplicity under uncertainty
results from pegging the noncontingent nominal interest rate instead of the state-
contingent nominal returns. If, instead, these were pegged, there would be a single
degree of multiplicity as in the deterministic case.
As mentioned before, an interest rate feedback rule does not solve this multi-
plicity problem.9 And neither does a money supply rule. Under certain conditions,
there is a locally determinate equilibrium, but, globally, there are still many equi-
libria.
9The rules in Adªo et al. (2009) and Loisel (2009) are exceptions.
102.3. Policy with state-contingent interest rates
In this section we show that a policy that pegs the state-contingent nominal
returns, as well as the money supply in the initial period, implements a unique
equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions are the resource constraint, (2.11), the intratem-
poral condition (2.12), the cash in advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal
conditions (2.6) and (2.7), as well as the budget constraints (2.10).
As before, from the resource constraints (2.11) and the intratemporal condition
(2.12) we obtain the functions C(R1 (st)) and L(R1 (st)).












, t ￿ 1 (2.14)
together with (2.8), the cash in advance condition, (2.3), and the budget constraint
that determines, not uniquely, the endogenous taxes and debt levels, (2.10).
Clearly if policy is conducted by setting exogenously the state-contingent nom-
inal interest rates, given the initial price level, the price levels, for every date and
state, are all determined. The proposition follows:
Proposition 2.1. If the state-contingent interest rates are set exogenously for
every date and state, given an initial price level, there is a unique equilibrium for
the allocations and prices.
Proof: Let P (s0) be given. Given the values for Q(st=st￿1), t ￿ 1, R1 (st),
t ￿ 0 are determined uniquely, and given P (st￿1), P (st) is obtained from the
intertemporal conditions (2.14) for t ￿ 1. The conditions only hold for t ￿ 1.
Cannot use the condition at t = 0, to determine P (s0). M (s0) could pin down
the initial price from the cash-in-advance constraint that, if R1 (s0) > 1, holds
with equality.￿
In these economies there is a unique equilibrium if monetary policy targets
the nominal returns on the state-contingent nominal assets and in addition money
supply is set exogenously in the initial period.
2.3.1. State-contingent debt in zero net supply
Even if the government stands ready to supply and demand any quantity of state-
contingent bonds at given state-contingent prices, these assets can be in zero net
11supply in every equilibrium. To see this notice that, when the supply of state-



































where, with Z (st) = 0, W(st) = M (st￿1)+
Pn
j=1 Rj (st+1￿j)B (st+1￿j)+P (st￿1)G(st￿1)￿
T (st￿1) is noncontingent. This must be satis￿ed for any allocation and prices,
at any period and state. Even with Z (st) = 0, there are still multiple solutions
of these equations for the endogenous nominal noncontingent debt and the lump
sum taxes.
3. The term structure
In this section we show the second main result of the paper, that there is an
equivalence between pegging state-contingent prices and noncontingent interest
rates for di⁄erent maturities.
In order to illustrate the results that we will derive more generally below, we
consider that in each period there are two possible events, st 2 fh;lg, t ￿ 1,
and suppose that there are one and two period noncontingent bonds. Then the























































































￿￿ uC (R1 (st;l;l))
P (st;l;l)
￿

















t￿ uC (R1 (st;l))
￿R1 (st;l)P (st;l)
￿
Given P (st), conditions (3.1) and (3.5) determine P (st;h) and P (st;l), pro-
vided R1 (st;h) 6= R1 (st;l). It follows that if R1 (st) and R2 (st) are set exoge-
nously, and R1 (st;h) 6= R1 (st;l), for all st, for a given initial price level P (s0),
there is a unique solution for the allocations and prices.
Conditions (3.1) and (3.5), are two linear equations in two unknowns, the
inverse of the price levels in the two states. As long as the matrix of coe¢ cients
is invertible there is a single solution. In order for that to be the case it must be
that the two rates R1 (st;h) and R1 (st;l) are di⁄erent, but they can di⁄er by an
arbitrarily small number. In this sense, the conditions for the invertibility of the
matrix are general.
The number of maturities cannot be lower than the number of possible events.
For the general case with n contingencies, the nxn matrix must also be invertible,
but that condition holds generally. The proposition follows.
Proposition 3.1. Let St = fs1;s2;:::;sng and suppose there are nominal non-
contingent assets of maturity j = 1;:::;n. If the returns on these assets are set
exogenously, then, in general, there is a unique equilibrium for the allocations and
prices, given the initial price level P (s0).
13Proof: See Appendix 1.￿
Corollary 3.2. Short and long term nominal interest rates are independent mon-
etary policy instruments.
Other than in the deterministic case, when the number of contingencies is
n ￿ 2, short and long rates are independent monetary policy instruments. As n
becomes arbitrarily large, the whole term structure can be pegged.
3.1. The zero bound
While the question of using long rates as an instrument of policy is typically raised
when short rates are very close to the zero lower bound, it turns out that, at the
zero bound, the conditions for the result in proposition 3.1 may not be veri￿ed.
If the economy was always at the zero bound, then R1 (st;h) = R1 (st;l) = 1,
and it follows that R2 (st) = 1. The condition of enough variability in the interest
rates is not ful￿lled. Short and long rates are not independent policy instruments.
It is possible for the nominal interest rate to be temporarily at the zero bound
and there be enough variability in future rates, so that the proposition still holds.
Furthermore, the variability in interest rates that is necessary is arbitrarily small,
so in that sense the results are robust.
4. Price setting restrictions
In this section we show that the results derived above extend to an environment
with sticky prices. We modify the environment to consider price setting restric-
tions. There is, now, a continuum of goods, indexed by i 2 [0;1]: Each good i
is produced by a di⁄erent ￿rm. The ￿rms are monopolistic competitive and set
prices in advance with di⁄erent lags.
















, ￿ > 1:
































The households￿intertemporal and intratemporal conditions are as before, (2.5),
(2.6) and (2.7).






















Given the prices on each good i in units of money, pi (st), the government mini-

































A fraction ￿j ￿rms set prices j periods in advance with j = 0;:::; J ￿1: Firms
















































where yi (st) = ci (st) + gi (st)


























Compared with the equilibrium conditions under ￿ exible prices, the set of
equilibrium conditions when prices are set in advance includes more variables,
the prices of the di⁄erent ￿rms, but it also includes more restrictions, the price
setting restrictions. The number of additional variables and restrictions is the
same, and the degrees of freedom are the same as under ￿ exible prices. The
degree of indeterminacy is the same as under ￿ exible prices and therefore the
result in proposition 2.1, that a peg of state-contingent interest rates delivers a
unique equilibrium, still holds when prices are set in advance.
Substituting the state-contingent prices Q(st+1=st￿j) in the price setting con-
ditions (4.6), and using the intertemporal condition (2.6) as well as the households￿






￿￿1 A(st)(1 ￿ L(st))￿
￿
(￿￿1)uL (st)P (st)




5 = 0, j = 0;:::J ￿ 1: (4.8)
The equilibrium conditions can then be summarized by the intertemporal con-
ditions (2.7) and (2.8), the intratemporal conditions (4.8), as well as the conditions












































10Notice that, if J = 1, meaning that there are only ￿ exible price ￿rms, p0 (st) = P (st) and







corresponding to (2.12), for the case where ￿ ! 1.
16The proposition follows:
Proposition 4.1. In the environment with prices set in advance, if the state-
contingent interest rates are set exogenously for every date and state, and the
money supply is set exogenously in the initial period, there is a unique equilibrium
for the allocations and prices.
Proof: Let fQ(st+1=st), t ￿ 0g be set exogenously. Then fR1 (st), t ￿ 0g are
determined uniquely by (2.8).
At any t ￿ J, given P (st￿1), C (st￿1) and L(st￿1) there are ￿t intertemporal
conditions, (2.7), ￿t resource constraints, (4.10), ￿t price level conditions, (4.9),
￿t￿j price setting conditions, j = 0;:::;J ￿ 1, (4.8). The variables are ￿t con-
sumption levels C (st), ￿t levels of leisure L(st), ￿t price levels and ￿t￿j prices
for the di⁄erent types of ￿rms, j = 0;:::;J ￿ 1.
For t = 0, there is one price level condition, one resource constraint, one price
setting condition. The variables are C (s0), L(s0), P (s0) and one price for the
￿ exible ￿rms in period 0. The other prices are historical. Can use the cash in
advance constraint with exogenous M0 to determine all the variables in period 0.
For t = 1, given P (s0), C (s0) and L(s0), there are ￿1 price level conditions, ￿1
resource constraints, ￿1+￿0 price setting conditions, ￿0 intertemporal conditions
to determine the same number of variables. The variables are ￿1 consumptions
C (s1), ￿1 levels of leisure L(s1), ￿1 price levels, ￿1 prices for the ￿ exible ￿rms
in period 1 and ￿0 prices for the ￿rms setting the price in period 0 for period 1.
Similarly for any period 1 ￿ t ￿ J ￿ 1.￿
Also in this environment targeting the term structure of interest rates is equiv-
alent to targeting the state-contingent interest rates. Notice that the number of
intertemporal conditions for the state-contingent assets (2.7) is the same as the
number of intertemporal conditions for noncontingent assets of di⁄erent maturities
(2.6), when the number of maturities is equal to the number of events.
5. Concluding Remarks
We make two major points in this paper. The ￿rst, of particular interest for policy,
that a central bank can independently target short and long nominal interest
rates, possibly the whole term structure of nominal interest rates. The second, of
more theoretical interest, that setting both short and long nominal interest rates
allows to solve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria associated with uncertainty,
17that arises when monetary policy is conducted with an interest rate rule for the
noncontingent, short-term, nominal interest rate.
We show that the target of the term structure is equivalent, under general
conditions, to the target of the state-contingent nominal returns. A monetary
policy that targets those returns is able to implement a unique equilibrium, for a
given initial price level. This is the case, whether prices are ￿ exible or sticky.
Interestingly, it is precisely at the zero bound, when there is particular interest
for alternative policy instruments, that our equivalence result breaks down. At
the zero bound, if the economy was to stay there, no matter what, the long rates
would have to be equal to the short rates and they would all be zero. Targeting
di⁄erent maturities would not solve the multiplicity problem. A target of the state
contingent interest rates would have to be used to implement a unique equilibrium
at the, consistently optimal, Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates. An
arbitrarily small deviation from the Friedman rule would, however, allow to recover
the equivalence result.
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If Rj (st), j = 1;:::;n are set exogenously, for a given price level P (st) these
are n equations in n unknowns, P (st;sj), j = 1;:::;n. As long as there is enough
variability in Rj (st;sj), j = 1;:::;n, that guarantees that the matrix of coe¢ cients
is invertible, there is a unique solution of the system of equations. For a given
initial price level P (s0), there is a unique solution for the allocations and prices.
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